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Unconscious Relational Inference Recruits the Hippocampus
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Relational inference denotes the capacity to encode, flexibly retrieve, and integrate multiple memories to combine past experiences to
update knowledge and improve decision-making in new situations. Although relational inference is thought to depend on the hippocam-
pus and consciousness, we now show in young, healthy men that it may occur outside consciousness but still recruits the hippocampus.
In temporally distinct and unique subliminal episodes, we presentedword pairs that either overlapped (“winter–red”, “red–computer”)
or not. Effects of unconscious relational inference emerged in reaction times recorded during unconscious encoding and in the outcome
of decisions made 1 min later at test, when participants judged the semantic relatedness of two supraliminal words. These words were
either episodically related through a common word (“winter–computer” related through “red”) or unrelated. Hippocampal activity
increased during the unconscious encoding of overlapping versus nonoverlapping word pairs and during the unconscious retrieval of
episodically related versus unrelated words. Furthermore, hippocampal activity during unconscious encoding predicted the outcome of
decisions made at test. Hence, unconscious inference may influence decision-making in new situations.
Introduction
We mentally combine distinct experiences to optimize our deci-
sions in new situations. Relational inference can be defined as the
ability to combine information from discontiguous past episodes
to guide decisions in new situations. Much evidence indicates
that relational inference requires hippocampal processing and
the conscious encoding/retrieval of episodes (Smith and Squire,
2005). We extend current views by showing that relational infer-
ence recruits the hippocampus even when encoding and retrieval
are unconscious.
Inference has been studied with paradigms that allow for the
conscious encoding and retrieval of episodes (Bunsey and
Eichenbaum, 1996; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Heckers et al.,
2004; Preston et al., 2004; Smith and Squire, 2005; Ellenbogen et
al., 2007). Participants encode stimulus pairs that contain over-
lapping elements (A–B, B–C). Pairs are presented in many learn-
ing trials for participants to choose one stimulus in a pair over the
other. The choice of a stimulus is reinforced, e.g., A is reinforced
over B and B over C. At test, new combinations of studied stimuli
are presented (A–C) for participants to choose again one stimu-
lus. For A–C, A is the correct choice. A correct choice enabled by
the flexible integration of A–B and B–C memories is considered
true inference (Leo and Greene, 2008), which is thought to de-
pend on the hippocampus (Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996;
Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Heckers et al., 2004; Preston et al.,
2004; Smith and Squire, 2005; Ellenbogen et al., 2007) and hence on
episodic (Tulving, 2002) or declarative (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993; Reber et al., 1996; Squire andWixted, 2011) memory. How-
ever, a correct choice at test may also result from the learning
of simple reward associations (A is always rewarded and C
never) that relies on the dopaminergic reward system (Frank
et al., 2003, 2006; Libben and Titone, 2008; Moses et al., 2010).
In contrast to standard transitive inference paradigms, the
premise pairs in the task used by Leo and Greene (2008) did
not have endpoints (i.e., there was not one item that was al-
ways reinforced and another that was never reinforced). When
the influence of a differential reinforcement history was elim-
inated, there was still evidence for inferential learning, re-
ferred to as “true inference.”
To avoid reward learning and all sorts of incremental learning
altogether and to favor a relational hippocampal processing
mode, we omitted reward and confined encoding to one trial.We
used an established masking technique (Degonda et al., 2005) to
present overlapping (A–B, B–C) and nonoverlapping (A–B,
C–D) word pairs for unconscious encoding. For retrieval, the
previously subliminally presented words were displayed suprath-
reshold and in new combinations. Words in a retrieval pair were
either episodically related, allowing for inference (A–C), or un-
related (A–D). The inference task was to decide whether the
words in a pair fit together semantically. Inference relied on par-
ticipants’ intrinsic analyses of A–B andB–Cpairs, whichmay lead
to opposing courses of inference. Episodically related stimuli
(A–C) may either be judged as semantically nearer or farther
from each other depending on whether the simultaneous associ-
ation of B with A and C is considered conflicting or agreeing. We
refer to an increase of perceived semantic distance as an instance
of divergence and to a decrease of perceived semantic distance as
convergence. Both convergence and divergence are valid courses
of inference in our paradigm.
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Thirty-threemenwere tested. An entirelymale samplewas tested because
men seem to display less diffuse and more lateralized brain activation
patterns in language tasks compared with women (Shaywitz et al., 1995).
Amale samplemight therefore benefit the signal-to-noise ratio of blood-
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals evoked by the subliminal word
pairs. Two participants were excluded because of excessive head-
movements in theMR scanner andone participant because he performed
above criterion (20 correct choices of 30) on the test of stimulus aware-
ness (see Test of awareness, below). The remaining thirty participants
were right-handed youngmen (mean age, 27.3 years; SD, 5.2 years). They
reported a normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and neither cur-
rent nor past neurological or psychiatric diagnoses nor the current con-
sumption of illegal or prescription drugs. All participants were paid for
participation and gave written semi-informed consent. The purpose of
the study and the presence of subliminal stimuli were disclosed at the end
of the session. The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli
We used 96 pairs of concrete German nouns in the main experiment.
Sixty-four word pairs were used for subliminal encoding and 32 word
pairs were used for the supraliminal test. Test word pairs were novel
combinations of words used for subliminal encoding. Half of the encod-
ing word pairs shared a word (see below). The mean number of charac-
ters per wordwas 6.52 (SD, 2.25) and themean logarithmof frequency of
use was 2.53 (SD, 0.98). For the direct test of awareness, we selected
another set of 60 concrete German nouns, of which 30 were used as
targets and 30 as distracters. The words used in the awareness test had a
similar mean number of characters per word (6.69; SD, 1.83) and a
similar mean logarithmic frequency of use (2.709; SD, 0.927) as in the
main experiment (ps 0.1). The frequency of use was determined using
the corpus Projekt Deutscher Wortschatz (for a detailed description of
the database, see Biemann et al., 2004).
Nouns assembled in encoding word pairs were semantically distant to
provoke the unconscious establishment of new semantic associations in
(unconscious) episodic memory. In the experimental condition, two en-
coding word pairs shared a word (A–B, B–C; e.g., winter–red, red–com-
puter). The corresponding test word pairs consisted of a novel
combination of encoding words (A–C; e.g.,
winter–computer). Thus, the twowords in test
pairs of the experimental condition were epi-
sodically related through an overlapping en-
coding word (B; e.g., red). For the control
condition, corresponding encoding word pairs
did not share a word (A–B, C–D; e.g., socks–
sushi, beard–dust). Again, the corresponding
test word pairs were novel combinations of the
encoding words (A–D; e.g., socks–dust). Un-
like the experimental condition, however, test
pairs in the control condition lacked episodic
relatedness established during encoding.
Two counterbalanced lists of stimuli were
created. Half of the participants received Stim-
ulus List 1 and the other half received Stimulus
List 2. Both lists contained stimuli for the ex-
perimental condition and stimuli for the con-
trol condition. The test stimuli in the two lists
were identical. But their encoding history was
different because overlapping encoding word
pairs in the experimental condition in List 1
became nonoverlapping encoding word pairs
in the control condition in List 2. To this aim,
the overlapping encoding words in the first list
were replaced by new words (List 1: winter–
red, red–computer 3 List 2: winter–red, tu-
lip–computer). The corresponding test pairs
(winter–computer)were therefore identical in
both lists but were either episodically related
(List 1) or unrelated (List 2). Conversely, an
overlap was introduced in the nonoverlapping encoding word pairs of
List 1 to obtain overlapping encoding word pairs for List 2 (List 1:
socks–sushi, beard–dust3 List 2: socks–sushi, sushi–dust). The corre-
sponding retrieval pair (socks–dust) was therefore either unrelated (List
1) or episodically related (List 2). This procedure ensured that, over all
participants, each retrieval word pair was presented an equal number of
times in the experimental and the control condition. Hence, when par-
ticipants were deciding whether the words in a retrieval pair fit together
semantically, a greater number of “fit” responses in one versus the other
condition could not be derived from a stimulus bias.
For the baseline condition, we formed 48 pairs of consonant strings
(e.g., brtmzh—nvpthw), of which 32 were used in the encoding part and
16 in the retrieval part of the experiment. Consonants were randomly
chained in each string. The length of consonant strings was seven letters.
Subliminal stimulus presentation
We used the masking technique of Degonda et al. (2005), Duss et al.
(2011), and Reber and Henke (2011). Each subliminal stimulus pair was
presented 12 times in a 6 s window, flanked by visual noisemasks (Fig. 1).
We consider this 6 s presentation of a stimulus pair as one subliminal
episode. Presentation durations were 17 ms for stimuli (S), 183 ms for
masks (M), and 233 ms for fixation crosses/bars (F). The presentation of
one stimulus was given in the following sequence F–M–S–M–M–S–M–
F–M–S–M–M–S–M–F–M–S–M–M–S–M–F–M–S–M–M–S–M–F–M–
S–M–M–S–M–F–M–S–M–M–S–M. For the attention task, a fixation
cross or a bar was presented at a frequency of 1 Hz during subliminal
runs. Once in six presentations or during one subliminal episode, the
fixation cross was randomly replaced by a vertical or horizontal bar. The
probability of the occurrence of a horizontal or a vertical bar was equal.
Participants’ task was to indicate the bar’s orientation by button press
immediately on its occurrence. They pushed the left button for horizon-
tal bars and the right button for vertical bars. Accuracy and reaction times
to horizontal and vertical bars were recorded. To conceal the purpose of
themasking sequence, subjects were informed that themasking sequence
measured attention alone.
Subliminal stimuli spanned a visual angle of 11° (height) 13° (width).
The software Presentation (http://www.neurobs.com/presentation) was
used for stimulus presentation. A BenQ SP831 DLP projector projected the
Figure 1. Presentation procedure for one subliminal episode. Each subliminal word pair was presented twelve times in a 6 s
timewindow,whichwe call one subliminal episode.Word pairs were flashed for 17ms flanked by patternmasks that consisted of
random arrangements of black and white pixels. A central fixation cross was presented once a second. Once in 6 s (i.e., in one
subliminal episode), the fixation cross was replaced by a horizontal or vertical bar. Participants performed an attention task that
required themto fixategazeon the central fixation cross and to indicatebybuttonpress theoccurrenceof ahorizontal (left key) and
vertical (right key) bar. Figure is reproduced from Reber and Henke (2011).
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computer-controlled stimulation (1024  768
resolution, 30-bit color depth, 60Hz refresh rate)
on a white screen, which was located in front of
the subject laying in theMR scanner.
Behavioral paradigm
The experiment took place in the completely
darkened MRI chamber. Stimuli were pro-
jected onto a screen located in front of the
scanner that participants could see through a
mirror, which was attached to their head coil.
To get acquaintedwith task procedures, partic-
ipants practiced tasks with different stimuli be-
fore the experiment started. The experiment
consisted of four runs (fMRI time series). Each
run contained an encoding and retrieval part.
Stimuli were presented blocked by condition.
Encoding. In the encoding part of each run,
eight overlapping word pairs (A–B, B–C; ex-
perimental condition) and eight nonoverlap-
ping word pairs (A–B, C–D; control
condition), as well as eight pairs of consonant
strings (baseline condition) were presented for
subliminal encoding (Fig. 2). Added over the
four runs, we presented a total of 32 stimulus
pairs per condition. Stimuli were arranged by
condition in blocks of four. Each run con-
tained two encoding blocks per condition. The
subliminal presentation of each stimulus pair
took 6 s (no interstimulus interval), which pro-
vided for block durations of 24 s. Sixty-six sec-
onds or 11 intervening subliminal word pairs
separated A–B fromB–C pairs presented in the
experimental condition and A–B from C–D
pairs presented in the control condition. Dur-
ing the presentation of subliminal stimuli, participants engaged in the
attention task (see Subliminal stimulus presentation, above). The atten-
tion task ensured central visual fixation and the maintenance of atten-
tion. An instruction slide was presented for 6 s at the beginning of the
encoding and the retrieval part in each run.
Retrieval. Retrieval followed encoding immediately in each of the four
runs (Fig. 2). Each run included four pairs of episodically related words
(A–C) in the experimental condition, four pairs of unrelated words
(A–D) in the control condition, and four pairs of new letter strings in the
baseline condition. Each stimulus pair was presented for 3.5 s followed by
a 1 s presentation of a blank screen. Because stimulus pairs were again
arranged in blocks of four, the retrieval part consisted of only three
blocks. Added over the four runs, we presented a total of 16 retrieval pairs
per condition.
Words presented in the experimental and control conditions were
“old” because they had been presented subliminally during the en-
coding part of the same run. However, their pairwise combination
was new. In the experimental condition, A was indirectly related to C
through B, because B was the common word in A–B and B–C pairs
during encoding. In the control condition, words in a pair were not
related. The indirect retrieval task required participants to decide
whether the words in an A–C or A–D pair fit together semantically (“fit”,
left key; “don’t fit”, right key). Participants were asked to adopt a loose
response criterion to achieve an equal amount of “fit” and “don’t fit”
responses. The temporal distance between the last encoding word pair
(B–C or C–D pair) and the corresponding retrieval word pair (A–C or A–D
pair) ranged between 55.5 and 72 s. The variability of this intervalwas due to
the difference in presentation durations between encoding and retrieval
word pairs and to the difference in the order of condition blocks between
participants. Although this time interval varied, there were always 11 inter-
vening subliminal or supraliminal stimulus pairs between the last encoding
word pair and the corresponding retrieval word pair.
Order of condition blocks and stimuli in condition blocks. The sequence
of condition blocks was varied between runs according to a Latin-square
design to distribute position effects of conditions between runs and par-
ticipants. A given order of condition blocks was maintained throughout
the encoding and retrieval part per run. The position within condition
blocks was maintained for corresponding word pairs (A–B, B–C, A–C)
within a run.
Test of awareness
Following the experiment, participants were interviewed on whether
they had suspected or even perceived subliminal stimuli or perceptual
fragments thereof. Then participants underwent the awareness test,
where stimulus discriminability was assessed objectively. Standard pro-
cedure to establish a claim of unconscious processing is to demonstrate
effects of subliminal stimuli in indirect tests (as used in the experiment)
in the absence of significant stimulus discrimination in a direct test
(Cheesman andMerikle, 1984; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006). Our direct
test was conducted in the MR scanner and consisted of 30 trials. In each
trial, we presented one subliminal word at the same screen location
where the right-handword in theword pairs presented in the experiment
had appeared. Thus, due to participants’ central visual fixation, we stim-
ulated their left (language-dominant) hemisphere. The reason why we
presented one instead of two words (as in the experiment) was to facili-
tate subliminal processing by reducing the amount of simultaneously
displayed information and by eliminating the effect of interhemispheric
inhibition on the simultaneous word processing within each hemisphere
(Cook, 1986). We figured that conscious awareness of subliminal word
pairs could safely be excluded in the experiment if even single words
could not be discerned in the final awareness test. Apart from presenting
only one instead of two words, the presentation procedure for a sublim-
inal stimuluswas the same as in the experiment: eachwordwas presented
in one subliminal episode, i.e., in 12 flashes of 17 ms each, flanked by
pattern masks and intermixed with fixation crosses or bars for the atten-
tion task. The participants pushed the left or right button immediately
upon occurrence of a horizontal or vertical bar, respectively (attention
task). Concurrent to the performance of the attention task, the partici-
pants were instructed to try to decipher the subliminal word. Immedi-
Figure 2. Experimental design. Displayed is one of four encoding–retrieval runs. In the encoding part of the run, we presented
word pairs subliminally while participants performed an attention task (Fig. 1). In the retrieval part of the run, we presentedword
pairs with suprathreshold durations for participants to decide whether the two words in a pair fit together semantically or not
(“fit”/“don’t fit” task). In the encoding and retrieval part of the run, word pairs were grouped by condition into blocks of four word
pairs (fMRI block design).
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ately following the presentation of one word in one subliminal trial,
participants chose between a target and a distracter word (forced-choice
test). We excluded participants from the analysis of the data from the
experiment if they had 20 of potentially 30 correct choices in this
awareness test. Twenty correct choices corresponded to the 5% cutoff of
the chance distribution of correct choices. One participant exceeded this
criterion and was therefore excluded from the analysis of the data of the
experiment.
MR image acquisition
The experimentwas performedon a 1.5 tesla Philips Achievawhole-body
magnetic resonance scanner equipped with an eight-channel head coil.
We obtained functional data by using a sensitivity-encoded single-shot
echo planar imaging sequence with an acceleration factor of r  2.0
(Schmidt et al., 2005). Thirty-four slices along the AC–PC line were
acquired, covering the whole brain with a field of view of 22 22 cm and
a measured spatial resolution of 2.75  2.75  4 mm3 (original voxel
size). The reconstructed resolution was 1.72  1.72  4 mm3 (recon-
structed voxel size). The time of repetition (TR) was 3 s, echo time (TE)
was 50 ms, and flip angle  was 90°. There were no interslice gaps. A
standard 3D T1-weighted scan was obtained for anatomical reference
[TE, 3.8ms; TR, 8.2ms; flip angle , 8°; 160 slices; original voxel size, 1
1 1 mm (no interpolation); field of view, 24 24 cm, no interslice
gaps].
Analysis of functional brain images
The fMRI data were analyzed using the statistical parametric mapping
toolbox (SPM5; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Preprocessing in-
cluded spatial realignment, slice-timing correction, coregistration of EPI
images to the participants anatomical reference image, normalization of
EPI images into a standard anatomical space [mean image of 152 subjects
from theMontrealNeurological Institute (MNI)], and spatial smoothing
with 8 mmGaussian kernel. Furthermore, the art-repair toolbox (http://
cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/ArtRepair/ArtRepair.htm) was used to detect
functional volumes with excessive scan-to-scan movement and global
signal variations. Such outlier volumes (2mmmovement per TR)were
replaced by an interpolation of the image before and after the outlier in
the time series.
First-level models were estimated separately for encoding and re-
trieval. Thesemodels included regressors thatwere created by convolving
a canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative
with boxcar functions of the onsets and offsets of the conditions for each
of the four runs. We also included six movement regressors. Contrast
images of paired sample t tests of interest (encoding: B–C vs C–D; re-
trieval: A–C vs A–D) that treated the temporal derivative andmovement
regressors as nuisance were subjected to random effects analyses. Com-
monalities in brain activation between subgroups of participants (con-
vergent and divergent thinkers) were assessed using conjunction analyses
against the global-null hypothesis (Price and Friston, 1997). Differences
in brain activation between subgroups of participants were assessed with
independent samples t tests. We used a one-sample t test model with one
covariate (i.e., the behavioral measure) to compute correlations between
the BOLD signal change and behavioral performance. Effects of this
covariate are reported. The height threshold for all fMRI group analyses
was p 0.001 (uncorrected). No cluster extent threshold was applied for
medial temporal lobe regions. For the rest of the brain, we used an extent
threshold of 20 voxels.
Results
Good performance on attention task
During the unconscious encoding of subliminal word pairs,
participants engaged in an attention task that required them to
indicate by button press when a repeatedly presented central
fixation cross flipped into a horizontal or vertical bar. The
number of correct answers in this task was high (mean, 95.4%;
SD, 3.6%), which indicates that participants were paying close
attention to the display on which subliminal stimuli were pre-
sented for encoding.
Reaction times at test indicate successful
relational integration
Wecomputed a repeated-measures ANOVAwith the factors Test
Condition (episodically related vs unrelated), Response (“fit” vs
“don’t fit”), and the dependent variable reaction time (RT) on the
semantic relatedness judgments. The main effect of Test Condi-
tion revealed that RTs to episodically related A–C pairs were
longer (mean, 2126 ms; SD, 378 ms) than RTs to unrelated A–D
pairs (mean, 2064ms; SD, 362ms; F(29,1) 6.62, p 0.015). This
result indicates that participants were capable of discriminating
between episodically related and unrelated test words. Additional
processing was apparently needed for the reactivation of A–B,
B–C, and A—B–C associations in the experimental condition.
The main effect of Response was also significant (F(1,29) 6.954,
p 0.013) and indicated that “fit” responses were generally faster
(mean, 2039 ms; SD, 338 ms) than “don’t fit” responses (mean,
2152 ms; SD, 428 ms). The interaction of Response Test Con-
dition was not significant (F(1,29)  1.838, p  0.186), which
suggests that the reaction time difference between conditions was
not modulated by the kind of response (“fit” vs “don’t fit”). This
reaction time difference was independent of the direction of in-
ference (convergence vs divergence; see below).
Accuracy at test indicates convergent and divergent styles of
relational inference
The information provided in overlapping encoding pairs (A–B,
B–C) is ambiguous with regard to the semantic relatedness of A
and C words. A–B encoding pairs may be considered conflicting
with B–C encoding pairs, giving rise to “don’t fit” responses to
A–C test pairs. We designate this style of inference as divergent.
Conversely, A–B encoding pairsmay be considered agreeing with
B–C encoding pairs, giving rise to “fit” responses to A–C test
pairs. We designate this style of inference as convergent.
The earliest time point during the experiment, at which par-
ticipants may make divergent or convergent inferences, is when
subliminal B–C pairs are being presented. At this time, partici-
pantsmay reactivate previously formedA–B associations because
they are cued by the subliminal B words. We thought of the
possibility that reaction times obtained on the attention task con-
current to subliminal encoding could be informative of whether
subliminal word pairs (B–C) were analyzed as conflicting (diver-
gence) or agreeing (convergence)with previously presentedword
pairs (A–B). Thus, we computed the difference in reaction times
on the attention task between periods of subliminal B–C trials
(experimental condition) and periods of subliminal C–D trials
(control condition): RT during B–C trials minus RT during C–D
trials. A positive RT difference shows slower reactions in the at-
tention task during the experimental than the control condition.
The second time point during the experiment, at which par-
ticipants may make divergent or convergent inferences, is at test,
when they engage in the semantic relatedness task judging epi-
sodically related A–C pairs (experimental condition) and unre-
lated A–D pairs (control condition). Divergent thinkers should
give more “don’t fit” responses to A–C than A–D pairs, while
convergent thinkers should give more “fit” responses to A–C
than A–D pairs. We computed the difference in the number of
“fit” responses between A–C and A–D pairs (number of “fit”
responses to A–C pairs minus number of “fit” responses to A–D
pairs). A negative difference shows less “fit” responses to A–C
pairs (experimental condition) versus A–D pairs (control condi-
tion). Negative versus positive values then suggest a divergent
versus convergent style of inference. Note that these values are
reciprocal to the values of “don’t fit” responses.
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The difference in reaction times on the attention task was
significantly correlated with the difference in the number of “fit”
responses (r0.429, p 0.018; Fig. 3). Slowed reactions in the
attention task during the processing of subliminal overlapping
B–C pairs versus nonoverlapping C–D pairs predicted a larger
number of “don’t fit” responses to episodically related A–C pairs
than unrelated A–D pairs. The significance of this correlation
between our two measures of inference supports the notion that
the current paradigm allows for two courses of inference: diver-
gent and convergent. It is remarkable that a measure recorded
during a conscious task (attention task), which is performed si-
multaneously with an unconscious encoding task, predicted the
outcome of unconscious encoding and inference as reflected in
decisions taken1 min later at test.
Divergent thinking was suggested by slowed reactions on the
attention task during periods, in which overlapping B–C versus
nonoverlapping C–D pairs were being presented, because slowed
reactions predicted more “don’t fit” responses to episodically
related A–C versus unrelated A–D words. Reactions in the atten-
tion task during periods where overlapping versus nonoverlap-
ping pairs were being presented might have been slowed because
divergent thinkers noticed a conflict between the retrieved A–B
pairs und the currently processed B–C pairs. This might have
given rise to puzzlement and distraction. A style of convergent
thinking was suggested by speeded reac-
tions to overlapping B–C versus nonover-
lapping C–D pairs that predicted a larger
number of “fit” responses to episodically
related A–C versus unrelated A–D words.
Speeded reactions during the encoding of
overlapping versus nonoverlapping pairs
in convergent thinkers may result from
agreeing analyses of retrieved A–B and
currently processed B–C pairs and from a
facilitated processing of repeated B words
in B–C pairs. Although the facilitated pro-
cessing of repeated B words might have
been at play in divergent thinkers as well,
it must have been overridden by the slow-
ing effect of conflict perception.
In the whole group of participants,
neither the difference in reaction times on
the attention task (B–C: mean, 642 ms;
SD, 68ms; C–D:mean, 641ms; SD, 67ms;
t(29) 0.35, p 0.729) nor the difference
in the number of “fit” responses (A–C:
mean, 6.63; SD, 1.77; A–D: mean, 6.83;
SD, 1.56; t(29)  0.42, p  0.592) di-
verged from zero.
As reported above, all participants ex-
hibited evidence of successful relational
integration, as evidenced by their longer
reaction times at test when judging epi-
sodically related versus unrelated words.
We now ask whether this measure of suc-
cessful relational integration is related to
participants’ style of inference (conver-
gent vs divergent). Successful relational
integration (difference in RT in A–C vs
A–D retrieval pairs) was correlated neither with the difference
in reaction times on the attention task (r  0.125, p  0.511)
nor with the difference in the number of “fit” responses (r 
0.194, p  0.305). Hence, successful relational integration
was not predictive of the style of inference (convergent vs
divergent).
To examine whether there was a systematic association of the
two versions of stimulus lists (initial and counterbalanced list)
Figure 3. Behavioral results. The difference in RT on the attention task during blocks of B–C
presentations (experimental condition) versus blocks of C–D presentations (control condition) pre-
dicted the difference in the number of “fit” responses to A–C pairs (experimental condition) versus
A–Dpairs(controlcondition).Topleftquadrant,Typicalpatternofparticipantswithaconvergentstyle
of inference: briefer reaction times toB–Cpairs thanC–Dpairs at encodingandmore “fit” answers to
A–C than A–D pairs at test. Bottom right quadrant, Typical pattern of participants with a divergent
styleof inference: longer reactiontimestoB–Cpairs thanC–Dpairsatencodingand less“fit”answers
(ormore “don’t fit” answers) to A–C thanA–Dpairs at test.
Figure 4. Commonbrainactivation inparticipantswithadivergentor convergent style of inference.A, Results in themedial temporal
lobe of a conjunction analysis performed on the encoding contrasts (B–C C–D) of convergent and divergent thinkers.B, Results in the
medial temporal lobeofaconjunctionanalysisperformedontheretrieval contrasts (A–CA–D)ofconvergentanddivergent thinkers.A,
B,Commonlyactivatedregionsaredepictedinyellowandreachsignificanceataheightthresholdofp0.001(uncorrected)andanextent
threshold of 0 voxel. These fMRI results are presented on sagittal sections of a T1-weightedMNI template of SPM. L, Left; R, right.
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with the group of convergent thinkers and the group of divergent
thinkers, we split the sample into a subsample of convergent
thinkers and a subsample of divergent thinkers. Participants with
a difference in the number of “fit” responses between the exper-
imental and control condition larger or smaller than zero were
assigned to the group of convergent (N 15) or divergent (N
15) thinkers, respectively. There was no systematic association of
the two versions of stimulus lists with the two groups (Fisher’s
exact test: p  0.466, two-tailed). Furthermore, an ANOVA in-
cluding the within-subjects factor Test Condition (experimental,
control), the two between-subjects factors Group (convergent,
divergent thinkers) and Stimulus List (List 1, List 2), and the
dependent variable numberof “fit” responses, revealed that both the
interactionofTestConditionwithStimulusList (F(1,26)0.283,p
0.599) and the interaction of Test Condition  Stimulus List 
Group were nonsignificant (F(1,26) 0.171, p 0.682). But, as ex-
pected, the interaction of Group Test Condition was significant
(F(1,26) 47.902, p 10
7). Hence, the pattern of “fit” responses
that convergent and divergent thinkers gave in the two conditions
was not influenced by stimulus lists.
Common brain activation in participants with a divergent
and convergent style of inference
Conjunction analyses (Price and Friston, 1997) of the BOLD sig-
nal contrasts of convergent and divergent thinkers were com-
puted to reveal brain regions commonly activated during
encoding and retrieval. For encoding, we computed the conjunc-
tion of the contrast between the processing of overlapping sub-
liminal B–C pairs versus nonoverlapping subliminal C–D pairs.
For retrieval, we computed the conjunction of the contrast be-
tween the processing of episodically related A–C pairs versus un-
related A–D pairs.
Convergent and divergent thinkers commonly activated the
left anterior hippocampus during the encoding of overlapping
B–C versus nonoverlapping C–D pairs (Fig. 4A, Table 1). This
result is remarkable because the hippocampal activity difference
might have been inversed due to a greater encoding requirement
in the control than the experimental condition: C–D pairs dis-
played in the control condition contained two new words, while
B–C pairs displayed in the experimental condition contained
only one newword.Despite less stimulus novelty, B–Cpairs chal-
lenged the left hippocampus more than C–D pairs, which may
have at least two reasons: (1) previously encoded A–B pairs were
reactivated upon cueing with the word B contained in B–C pairs,
and (2) integrated representations of A–B and B–C pairs were
established (Shohamy andWagner, 2008). As reported above, the
RT recorded during encoding spoke for the presence of inferen-
tial thinking at the time of B–C presentations, which necessitates
an unconscious cued recall of A–B pairs and an unconscious
integration of A–B with B–C pairs. Concomitant activity in-
creases in the right parahippocampal cortex (Fig. 4A, Table 1),
which has a role in the processing of contextual (both spatial and
nonspatial) associations (Bar et al., 2008), suggest that words
were contextually associated. Additional activity increases within
bilateral areas of the superior temporal gyrus and areas of the
right middle temporal gyrus (Table 1) suggest that additional
semantic operations (Patterson et al., 2007; Binder et al., 2009)
were required in the experimental versus the control condition.
These additional semantic operations likely accompanied the re-
covery of concepts of A words and the integration of concepts of
A, B, and C words as well as inferential thinking (independently
of the direction of inference). The reason why primarily right
rather than left lateral temporal activity increases emerged in this
contrastmight be the integrative style of encoding and inferential
thinking. In fact, right hemisphere homologues of language areas
have been found to support the achievement of coherence in
language processing (St George et al., 1999; Jung-Beeman, 2005)
and themaking of inferences during story comprehension (Jung-
Beeman, 2005; Virtue et al., 2006). Further activity increases in
the left and right middle occipital gyrus (Table 1) may indicate
more mental visuospatial processing (Viard et al., 2011) in the
experimental condition (B–C), where A–B pairs were reactivated
and integrated with B–C pairs, than the control condition, where
new pairs were encoded.
The conjunction of the reverse encoding contrasts yielded no
significant results, indicating that neural computations in the
control condition did not exceed those in the experimental
condition.
The conjunction of the retrieval contrasts, which compared the
processing of episodically related A–C pairs versus unrelated A–D
pairs, revealed activity increases in the left and right anterior hip-
pocampus near the above-reported encoding-related activation fo-
cus (Fig. 4B, Table 1).Hence, the recovery ofA–B andB–C relations
upon confrontationwithA–C, and thepotential additional recovery
of earlier (during encoding) formed mental representations of
A–B–C relations, engaged the anterior hippocampus bilaterally.
Further activity fociwere located in the anterior cingulate gyrus (Ta-
ble 1), a region that supports the retrieval from episodic memory
(Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) and—more generally—retrieval from
declarative memory (Burianova et al., 2010).
The conjunction of the reverse retrieval contrasts also yielded
significant results (Table 1). An area in the left posterior hip-
pocampus exhibitedmore activitywhenunrelatedA–Dpairs ver-
sus episodically related A–C pairs were displayed. The inspection
of the beta weights of each condition (A–C, A–D, baseline) in the
Table 1. Common brain activation in participants with a divergent and convergent
style of inference
Brain region BA Side
MNI coordinates
K t zx y z
Encoding
B–C C–D
Hippocampus L 24 4 24 14 2.46 3.70
Parahippocampal cortex 30 R 20 44 6 21 2.88 4.18
Middle and superior
temporal gyrus
21/22 R 64 16 2 99 3.67 5.01
Middle temporal gyrus 39 R 38 72 12 51 3.19 4.52
Superior temporal gyrus 22 L 58 0 2 35 2.91 4.21
Middle cingulate gyrus 32 L 6 2 42 32 2.69 3.96
Precentral gyrus, superior
frontal gyrus
4/6 R 28 12 72 76 3.18 4.50
Middle occipital gyrus 18 L 24 92 14 47 2.96 4.26
Middle occipital gyrus 19 R 30 82 10 32 2.96 4.27
C–D B–C N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
Retrieval
A–C A–D
Hippocampus L 32 8 20 8 2.42 3.65
Hippocampus R 36 6 16 27 2.97 4.22
Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 L 10 20 38 27 2.89 4.19
Anterior cingulate gyrus 24 L/R 2 22 24 25 2.74 4.02
A–D A–C
Hippocampus L 22 30 6 12 2.33 3.56
Fusiform gyrus 20 R 34 36 20 56 2.8 4.09
Superior frontal gyrus 10 R 20 52 20 23 2.86 4.16
Superior parietal lobule 7 L 16 74 36 75 3.11 4.43
Height threshold p 0.001; extent threshold 0 voxels for themedial temporal lobe and 20 voxels for the rest of
the brain. MNI coordinates stand for the peak voxel within significantly activated cluster of voxels. k, Extent of
significant cluster (number of voxels); BA, Brodmann area; L, left; R, right; N.S., no significant results.
Reber et al. • Unconscious Relational Inference J. Neurosci., May 2, 2012 • 32(18):6138–6148 • 6143
peak voxel of this cluster revealed that this difference was due to a
deactivation in the A–C versus the A–D and baseline condition. A
deactivation or enhanced deactivation during the inspection of
A–C versus A–D and baseline stimuli was also the reason for
further effects located in the left superior parietal lobule, the right
superior frontal gyrus, and the right fusiform gyrus.
Encoding activity predicted performance at test
We correlated the encoding contrast (B–C  C–D) and the re-
trieval contrast (A–C A–D) with the absolute difference in the
number of “fit” responses to A–C pairs versus A–D pairs. The use
of absolute difference values brings convergent and divergent
thinkers on a common scale that ranges from zero to 16.
The positive correlation of the encoding contrast with perfor-
mance at test yielded significant results in areas that also provided
significant results in the above-reported conjunction of encoding
contrasts. These areas are the anterior part of hippocampus (right
side), parahippocampal cortex (bilaterally), and the superior
temporal gyrus (left side). Further significant correlations ap-
peared in the right perirhinal cortex and left amygdala (Fig. 5).
Those participants who activated these temporal areas to a large
extent during the presentation of B–C versus C–D pairs yielded a
larger performance score at test. The cognitive processes thatmay
have driven the correlations in these areas likely consisted of the
mental reactivation of previously encoded semantic relations be-
tween A–B pairs and their integration with the currently encoded
B–C pairs in the experimental condition. The better participants
succeeded in semantically integrating the two pairs at encoding,
the better they performed at test. Because both participants with
a convergent and participants with a divergent style of inference
contributed to these correlations (Fig. 5), we assume that the
direction of inference—convergent versus divergent—did not
determine performance at test. We would like to point out that
the above correlations show that neuroimaging data recorded
during subliminal encoding, which was recorded1 min before
test, predicted decisions taken at test. This suggests that uncon-
scious encoding processes can durably affect apparently deliber-
ate choices in new situations.
The inverse correlation of the encoding contrast with perfor-
mance at test yielded no significant results. This means that nei-
ther activity-decreases in the experimental versus the control
condition nor activity-increases in the control versus the experi-
Figure 5. Encoding activity predicted performance at test. Results of the correlation between the encoding contrast (B–C C–D) and the absolute difference in the number of “fit” responses
given to A–C (experimental condition) versus A–D pairs (control condition) at test. Because we used absolute difference values in this correlation, high test scores represent a good performance in
both convergent and divergent thinkers. Significant results of the correlation are depicted in yellow andmarked by a blue crosshair on coronal sections of a T1-weightedMNI template of SPM. These
results reached significance at a height threshold of p 0.001 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of 0 voxel for medial temporal lobe areas and 20 voxels for all other brain regions. Significant
correlations are also presented in scatter plots, where blue symbols stand for convergent thinkers and red symbols for divergent thinkers. The first eigenvariate of a significant cluster was extracted
and depicted in arbitrary units on the y-axes of the scatter plots. L, Left; R, right.
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mental condition related linearly to performance at test. Equally,
neither the positive nor the inverse correlation of the retrieval
contrast with test performance yielded significant results. Hence,
brain activation during the encoding of overlapping pairs was
predictive of test performance, while brain activity recorded dur-
ing test performance was not. A possible reason for this is that an
essential part of relational integration and convergent/divergent
inference is performed during encoding rather than test. Related
blood oxygenation changes might therefore predict performance
at test better than blood oxygenation changes recorded in the test
situation itself.
Differences in brain activation between participants with a
divergent and convergent style of inference
The above results suggest that both participants with a conver-
gent and participants with a divergent style of inference are capa-
ble of unconscious relational integration using similar neural
networks. Here, we explored how differences in the two cognitive
styles map onto differences in brain activation. To this aim, we
computed comparisons between the two groups’ encoding con-
trasts and retrieval contrasts.
A convergent style of inference at the time of encoding was
associated with increases of activity in a large area of the posterior
cingulate gyrus (Table 2). The posterior cingulate gyrus is a mul-
timodal association area that integrates retrieved and newly pre-
sented information (Ryan et al., 2001; Hunkin et al., 2002). It is
possible that convergent thinkers investedmore neural resources
into the integration of reactivated A–B words and currently en-
coded B–C words. Convergent versus divergent thinkers also ex-
hibited activity increases at the time of retrieval. These activity
increases were located in the right anterior cingulate gyrus, left
parahippocampal cortex, and right middle occipital gyrus (Table
2). Because the anterior cingulate gyrus is prominently engaged
in the retrieval from episodic memory (Cabeza and Nyberg,
2000) and—more generally—retrieval from declarative memory
(Burianova et al., 2010), convergent thinkers might have re-
cruited more neurons to recover learned relations. That this re-
covery concerned verbal–conceptual information (Binder et al.,
2009), in particular associations (Bar et al., 2008), is suggested by
the activity increase in left parahippocampal cortex. Convergers’
versus divergers’ activity increases in the right middle occipital
gyrus point to a greater recruitment of neurons in a region that is
known to support visuospatial processing, which promotes the
retrieval of episodes experienced in the past (Viard et al., 2011).
Although the above-reported conjunction analysis showed that
convergent and divergent thinkers activated a large common en-
coding and retrieval network, these results indicate that conver-
gent thinkers invested additional neural resources compared
with divergent thinkers into associative encoding and retrieval.
When we compared the two groups’ test performances using the
above-introduced absolute difference in the number of “fit” re-
sponses to A–C pairs versus A–D pairs, convergent thinkers ex-
hibited a marginally better performance than divergent thinkers
(converger: mean, 4.33; SD, 2.09; diverger: mean, 2.73; SD, 2.31;
t(28)  1.99, p  0.057). Hence, a convergent thinking mode
benefitted relational integration.
A divergent versus convergent style of inference was associ-
ated with increased activity in the medial portion of the superior
frontal gyrus at the time of encoding, but no differential activity
was found at the time of retrieval (Table 2). Themedial portion of
the superior frontal gyrus has been found activated during the
monitoring of conflicts (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), and in partic-
ular when evaluating sentences that were conflicting and ambig-
uous (Ye and Zhou, 2009). In the present study, divergent
thinkers may have noticed conflicts between previously encoded
A–B and currently processed B–C pairs.
Postexperimental assessment of awareness
Tomake a claim of unconscious processing, it is vital to exclude the
possibility of a conscious contamination of subliminal word encod-
ing. At the end of the experiment, participants underwent a struc-
tured interview aimed at revealing whether they had suspected
subliminal stimuli. None of participants reported to have suspected
or even perceived subliminal stimuli or fragments thereof. Finally,
we conducted a forced-choice test to objectify potential con-
sciousness of word perception. It is standard procedure to con-
trast performance in so-called “direct” tests that tap primarily
conscious stimulus perception with the performance in “indi-
rect” tests that tap primarily unconscious stimulus perception
(Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006). A
claim of unconscious perception can be made if the indirect test,
but not the direct test, yields significant effects of stimulus per-
ception (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984). Participants’ forced-
choice behavior in the direct test revealed chance performance
(correct: mean, 14.6; SD, 1.63; incorrect: mean, 15.4; SD, 1.63;
t(29)  1.343, p  0.380, one-tailed). Thus, participants’ sub-
jective reports and their forced-choice behavior indicated that
subliminal words were not consciously perceived.
We also computed a regression analysis (Greenwald et al.,
1995), in which the performance in the awareness test was the
predictor of the RT difference between A–C and A–D pairs in the
experiment. This analysis revealed a significant intercept ( y-axis
intercept  64.70 ms, t(29)  2.571, p  0.016), while the slope
was not significant (B  0.085, t(29)  0.453, p  0.654). This
result indicates that unconscious relational integration as mea-
sured in the experiment was not correlated with stimulus dis-
criminability as assessed in the awareness test. The significant
intercept suggests that unconscious processing persists, even if
potential contributions of conscious stimulus processing are re-
gressed out (Greenwald et al., 1995).
Discussion
The behavioral results indicate that participants had encoded se-
mantic relations between words within and across subliminal
episodes. The successful integration of two overlapping word
Table 2. Differences in brain activation between participants with a divergent and
convergent style of inference
Brain region BA Side
MNI coordinates




Posterior cingulate gyrus 23 L 16 42 24 75 4.29 3.71
Retrieval (A–C A–D)
Parahippocampal cortex 30 L 12 42 2 36 4.79 4.04
Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 R 12 4 46 29 4.65 3.95




Medial portion of superior
frontal gyrus
8 L/R 0 34 54 21 4.13 3.6
Retrieval (A–C A–D) Noactivations
Height threshold p 0.001; extent threshold 0 voxels for themedial temporal lobe and 20 voxels for the rest of
the brain. MNI coordinates stand for the peak voxel within significantly activated cluster of voxels. k, Extent of
significant cluster (number of voxels); BA, Brodmann area; L, left; R, right.
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pairs speaks for a rapidmode of encoding and a durable retention
of the formed associations because subliminal episodes were
unique (no repetitions) and presented 66 s away from their cor-
responding subliminal episode. The behavioral and imaging data
suggest that relational integration and inferential thinking started
at the time of encoding and were resumed and perhaps com-
pleted at the time of test.
Half of participants (divergent thinkers) seem to have consid-
ered a word’s simultaneous association with two other words as
conflicting and inferred that the two simultaneously associated
words were semantically distant. The other half of participants
(convergent thinkers) seemed to have accommodated the two
associates with their common word in an agreeing way, inferring
that the two associates were semantically near. Both directions of
inference, convergent and divergent, are valid outcomes in the
current paradigm because we did notmanipulate the direction of
inference experimentally. Convergent and divergent thinkers did
not appear to differ much in terms of their ability for relational
integration, as evidenced by the behavioral and imaging data
(Figs. 3, 5; Table 2). Therefore, a divergent style of inference
cannot be explained by a better item–context or item–itemmem-
ory that would provide for a larger mnemonic basis for the per-
ception of competition between A and C words (Provyn et al.,
2007; Buchler et al., 2011). If anything, our data indicate that a
convergent thinking mode benefits relational encoding and inte-
grationmore than a divergent thinkingmode because convergent
thinkers invested additional neural resources into associative en-
coding/retrieval and exhibited a slightly better test performance.
Importantly, all relevant cognitive processes—encoding, re-
trieval, integration, and inference—were performed outside partic-
ipants’ conscious awareness. Despite participants’ unawareness of
encoding, integrating, and retrieving overlapping word pairs, they
exhibited large effects inmedial temporal areas, in particular within
the anterior hippocampus. Notably, anterior hippocampal activity
recorded at the time of encoding predicted the outcome of related-
ness decisions taken1 min later at test. These findings point to a
role of the anterior hippocampus (and othermedial temporal struc-
tures) inunconscious relational integration.Because thedirectionof
inference—convergent versus divergent—did not modulate hip-
pocampal activity, we assume that hippocampal encoding, retrieval,
and integration processes provided an information base for neural
computations in other brain areas to afford inference. The inferen-
tial thinkingmode in turnmight thenhaveaffected relational encod-
ing/retrieval by modulating cognitive and neural computations
outside the hippocampus.
These results corroborate previous evidence of a hippocampal
role in the rapid relational encoding of subliminal stimulus pairs
and their long-term retention (Henke et al., 2003a,b; Degonda et
al., 2005). In addition, these results expand the scope of compu-
tations believed possible without consciousness and assisted by
the hippocampus. Unconscious relational memories were reacti-
vated when prompted by subliminal retrieval cues (B words con-
tained in B–C pairs), integrated over subliminal episodes, and
reactivated upon presentation of a new configuration of encod-
ing words. The fact that subliminal words were effective retrieval
cues shows that even the sparse and brief neural activity elicited
by a subliminal cue is conducive to the reactivation of a weak
memory trace formed earlier during a subliminal event. Most
importantly, the present results show that associations formed in
the course of distinct subliminal events may be integrated. This
extends previous evidence of subliminal encoding and retrieval of
individual associations (Henke et al., 2003a,b; Degonda et al.,
2005; Duss et al., 2011). Finally, the retrieval context in the cur-
rent experiment called for a flexible retrieval of two intertwined
memory traces, whereas the retrieval cues provided in the earlier
studies helped to reactivate only one association at a time (Henke
et al., 2003a,b; Degonda et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011).
The first evidence that true inference may proceed uncon-
sciously was provided by Greene and colleagues (Greene et al.,
2001, 2006; Leo and Greene, 2008). The participants in their
studies had consciously encoded suprathreshold premise pairs.
The participants’ performance at test indicated successful infer-
ence even if they reported to be unaware of the rules that gov-
erned their decisions (Greene et al., 2001, 2006; Leo and Greene,
2008). The current findings underscore these results and extend
them by showing that awareness is not even required for the
encoding of premise pairs. Greene and colleagues (Greene et al.,
2001, 2006; Leo and Greene, 2008), as well as other investigators
of unconscious inference (Smith and Squire, 2005; Libben and
Titone, 2008;Moses et al., 2010), presented the encoding and test
material suprathreshold, i.e., for conscious inspection. Aware-
ness of the interrelatedness between encoding items was assessed
following the experiment using a questionnaire. Although this
procedure corresponds to common practice, we believe that con-
sciousness of the task structure is more reliably excluded if the
encoding material is presented invisibly to participants.
Our fMRI data indicate that the hippocampus contributed to
the integration of memories of word pairs both at the time of
encoding, when B-C pairs were presented, and again at the time
of test. Reaction times recorded on the attention task, which par-
ticipants performed during the subliminal presentations, indi-
cated that participants made already convergent or divergent
inferences when they were confronted with overlapping sublim-
inal word pairs. While this finding speaks for an early time point
of relational integration and implicates a facilitated processing of
episodically related words at test (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008),
reaction times at test were in fact longer for episodically related
than unrelated word pairs. We assume that relational integration
was initiated at the time of encoding and resumed and completed
at the time of test, which extended reaction times on the group
level. Nevertheless, some participants displayed faster reactions
to episodically related versus unrelated test pairs suggesting that
these participants proceeded further with relational integration
at the time of encoding than the rest of our participants. Accord-
ingly, more efficient processing of episodically related words was
predicted by increased hippocampal activity at the time of encod-
ing. It should be noted that a previous behavioral study with a
similar design yielded faster reactions to A-C than A-D test pairs
also on the group level (Reber and Henke, 2012). Because those
participants were examined in a completely calm environment
(no MR noise) and were well rested, they may have been able to
fully integrate overlapping word pairs at encoding, which saved
them processing time at test. The current participants, however,
performed this experiment as the last in a series of fMRI experi-
ments that day andwere exposed to scanner noise for a long time.
Together, we assume that relational integration and inference
may not proceed in an all-or-none fashion, but may be distrib-
uted in time, occurring during encoding (Shohamy andWagner,
2008), between study and test (Ellenbogen et al., 2007), or at test
(Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Heckers et al., 2004; Preston et
al., 2004).
The finding of a hippocampal involvement in unconscious
relational integration and inference is at odds with classic notions
of human long-term memory that segregate memory systems
according to consciousness of encoding and retrieval (Tulving,
2002; Squire, 2004; Smith et al., 2006; Squire and Wixted, 2011).
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The medial temporal lobe, and in particular the hippocampus, is
considered part of a memory system that subserves only the con-
scious formation and retrieval of episodic or declarative memo-
ries. Accordingly, only conscious memories are thought to be
flexibly integrated and expressed (Reber et al., 1996; Smith and
Squire, 2005). However, these classic notions have been ques-
tioned by the finding of implicit inference (Greene et al., 2001,
2006; Leo andGreene, 2008), by the finding of an implicit expres-
sion of hippocampus-dependent memory indexed by eye move-
ments (Hannula and Ranganath, 2009; Voss et al., 2011), and by
the finding of unconscious association formation and retrieval
with concurrent hippocampal activation (Henke et al., 2003a,b;
Degonda et al., 2005). Our current findings extend these previous
findings by showing that the exclusion of conscious awareness of
encoding and retrieval does not abolish rapid relational integra-
tion or long-term storage or the flexible expression of memories
in new contexts or task-related hippocampal computation.
Our evidence supports recent accounts of medial temporal
lobe functions that emphasize the computational capabilities of
medial temporal structures and the nature of the information
that is processed and stored in medial temporal regions
(Eichenbaum et al., 1999, 2007; Ryan et al., 2000; Brown and
Aggleton, 2001; Bussey and Saksida, 2005;Moses andRyan, 2006;
Mayes et al., 2007; Henke, 2010; Ranganath, 2010). These
processing-based viewpoints advance our understanding because
they reveal basic computational principles of medial temporal
structures that come into effect in various cognitive situations.
These basic computational principlesmay help linking tradition-
ally separate fields of research, such as long- and short-term
memory (Ranganath, 2010); memory and perception (Bussey
and Saksida, 2005); andmemory, spatial navigation, future plan-
ning, and inference (Eichenbaum et al., 1999). More specifically,
our evidence supports the relational memory theory that does
not consider consciousness a necessary condition for hippocam-
pal processing (Ryan et al., 2000;Moses andRyan, 2006). Accord-
ing to the relational memory theory (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993), the hippocampus encodes a memory space in which the
relationships between the various aspects of experienced events
are associated in a flexible way that allows for inference and
memory-based predictions. Our evidence also supports a model
that distinguishes memory systems on grounds of their compu-
tational capabilities (Henke, 2010). Whenever rapid and flexible
relation formation and retrieval are required, hippocampal pro-
cessing is called for, independently of consciousness of the ongo-
ing memory processes.
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